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The Growth of the Non-institutional Response 
in the Canadian Industrial Sector 
Maxwell Flood 
In this paper, the author focuses on analyzing and 
explaining the widespread émergence of « non-institutional 
response ». 
One of the most difficult problems facing sociologists in the présent 
décade is that of analyzing and explaining the widespread émergence of 
a phenomenon that we shall call the « non-institutional response. » 1 This 
concept is defined hère as that process whereby persons, who are members 
of larger social Systems or organizations, resort to non-institutional means 
in attempts to change aspects of their organizationai or social environ-
ment. Where channels and procédures already exist for the induction of 
orderly changes in social relations, the émergence of the non-institutional 
response constitutes a challenge to existing power structures, wherever it 
émerges, in that it not only calls for changes in social relations or 
objective environmental conditions but, by its very émergence, challenges 
the legitimacy of existing procédures and the authority relations upon 
which they are founded. The ultimate non-institutional response in the 
political sector, for example, would involve the revolutionary rejeotion of 
the total System and the replace-
ment of one ruling élite by another. 
The concept of non-institution-
al response is related to the wider 
1
 This paper is based upon material from : FLOOD, Maxwell, The Wildcat 
Strike : Non-institutional Response in the Industrial Sector, Unpublished Ph.D. Dis-
sertation, Michigan State University, 1971. 
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concept of social change. It is specifically related to the question of the 
means used in the process. For example, revolutionary socialism and 
revolutionary communism may be regarded as idéologies that are founded 
upon similar conceptions of the nature of man, the « evils » of capitalism, 
and the need for a more équitable distribution of resources ; but they are 
fundamentally dissimilar with respect to the means that they advocate to 
achieve their objectives. Whereas, the socialist system chooses to work 
for change within the fabric of the existing structure, the communist 
system tends to advocate employment of the ultimate non-institutional 
response — the revolutionary overthrow of the existing power structure. 
However, once the communist régime is established, further utilisation of 
the non-institutional response is not likely to be tolerated. In this respect 
the communist power structure is the same as ail others in that it correctly 
interprète the émergence of a non-institutional response as a challenge to 
its legitimacy. 
The non-institutional response poses a problem in any system in 
which it émerges on the basis of its challenge to the legitimacy of the 
existing power structure. For example, in the so-called démocratie Systems, 
social conflict can be tolerated so long as it proceeds along institutional 
channels. Disagreements can, in the final analysis be reduced to a dif-
férence of opinions. Thèse can be debated and fought over without threat 
to the overall structure of the system. The émergence of non-institutional 
behavior, on the other hand, constitutes a threat to the normative system 
out of which it émerges. 
In récent years, the non-institutional response has become an ubi-
quitous phenomenon. It has emerged in the universities and ghettos of 
the United States, the collèges and factories of Europe, the political 
Systems of some Eastern-bloc countries, and, in its ultimate fomi, in 
the social Systems of some new African nations. In some of the newer 
Systems, its émergence can be explained by the fact that channels of social 
change hâve never been developed, or hâve been inadequately deveïoped. 
In such cases, the response may be met by the création or élaboration of 
adéquate channels. In other instances, the non-institutional response seeks 
the création of new status relationships between members and authority 
structures. This is particularly the case in the United States where both 
Negro and student groups no longer appear willing to accept the tradi-
tional status relationships conferred on them by their respective authority-
status Systems. In such cases, the création of new status relationships 
involves not only basic changes in normative structure but also the 
development of effective channels to cope with continuing social change. 
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In many of thèse areas and sectors, the émergence of the non-institutional 
response can be explained by the historical absence or inadequacies of 
channels for social change. This absence, of course, has to be explained 
at the more fundamental level on the basis of a lack of prior effective 
value confrontation. 
THE INDUSTRIAL CASE 
This has not been the case in the industrial sector where, after a 
period of non-institutional response in the thirties, labor unions did secure 
récognition and did develop elaborate institutional mechanisms to cope 
with problems arising in the industrial relationship. The processes of 
collective bargaining and grievance procédures might hâve been expected 
to cope with both intermittent économie problems and émergent social 
problems within the industrial sector. If existing structures are regarded 
as adéquate we are faced with the problem of explaining the persistence 
and possible growth, in some industrial Systems, of the incidence of the 
non-institutional response by groups of workers. The major form that the 
non-institutional response takes in the industrial sector is the wildeat strike. 
In this connection, the kinds of empirical questions that émerge are of 
the following order : 
1. Why, despite the availability of elaborate institutional 
mechanisms, do groups of workers produce an non-
institutional response as they attempt to cope with 
situations that they define as problems ? 
2. Why do groups of workers reject the union, their 
legitimate spokesman and change agent, as they seek 
to solve problems arising in the employée-management 
relationship ? 
3. Is the non-institutional behavior a response to the 
concrète working environment, the industrial structure, 
the union-organizational structure, or a displaced res-
ponse to factors in the wider social System ? 
Wildeat strikes occur within the context of elaborate mechanisms 
for coping with change and this fact présents both a perplexing industrial 
problem and a significant sociological challenge. Their sociological signi-
finance stems from the fact that they constitute one category of the more 
gênerai phenomenon of the non-institutional response. They also présent 
the challenge of explaining the problem of the persistence of the non-
institutional response in the apparent présence of elaborate channels for 
social change. One is forced to consider that the channels for social 
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change may be more apparent than real. The question is raised of whether 
the existence of elaborate formai channels for change are defined as 
effective from the point of view of various segments and levels of the 
organization. There is also the wider question of the possible development, 
over time, of cleavage between the needs of particular units of a large-
scale organization and the needs of the organization itself. This is not to 
suggest that an organization per se actually acquires needs, but it is con-
ceivable that those who occupy the directional rôles in an organization 
may make choices that they define as being in the best interests of the 
overall organization which do not meet the needs of particular segments 
of the organization's constituency. It is in thèse terms that conflict may 
arise within a union organization on such issues as : responsibility v. 
militancy ; long-term goals v. short-term goals ; or broad organizational 
goals for the total membership v. spécial needs for particular segments of 
the membership. The resort to the non-institutional response by union 
members may be explained in terms of thèse kinds of cleavage between 
the organization and segments of the membership. 
Other factors to be considered include the fact that while many labor 
organizations began their careers as social movements, their growth and 
development, over the years, has tended to follow the pattern of other 
large-scale organizations. This raises the question of the possible growth 
of bureaucratization to the point that it renders the organization non-res-
ponsive to some of the needs of its membership. Some wildcat strikes 
may be explained as a non-institutional response by a group of members 
to such bureaucratization. In such a case, the wildcat strike may actually 
constitute the development of an incipient social movement within the 
organization or a segment of it. Hère, the outcome may be a measure of 
revitalization of the organization, or alternatively, the crushing of the 
incipient social movement. 
It is also possible that a union may become subject to administrative 
constraints, emanating from the wider political system, to such a degree 
that it is unable to exercise the degree of militancy that the membership 
demand in the pursuit of their goals. In such a situation, a group of 
members may utilise the non-institutional response to overcome the lack 
of independence being enjoyed by their institutional agent. 
THE PROBLEM OF INCIDENCE 
The incidence rates of wildcat strikes cannot be established directly 
because of the difficulties of identification. A strike cannot be identifiée 
THE GROWTH OF THE NON-INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE IN THE CANADIAN . . . 607 
clearly as a wildcat other than by empirical investigation. Even where a 
strike is claimed to be a wildcat by union leaders, empirical study of the 
situation is necessary to insure that it is a genuine and not a pseudo-
wildcat.2 It is not surprising that government agencies responsible for the 
collection of strike statistics make not attempt to collect and report the 
incidence rates of wildcat strikes. As a resuit of this it is impossible to 
obtain plots of the incidence of wildcat strikes within particular industrial 
Systems, over time, in any direct fashion. 
Some attempts hâve been made to establish the incidence rates of 
wildcat strikes by inference. For example, Kuhn has taken the position 
that existing government statistics in the United States may be used to 
produce the relative incidence of wildcat strikes if one makes the assump-
tion that such strikes are characteristicalry of short duration.3 The U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics does provide information on work stoppages 
arising out of labor-management disputes, involving six or more workers, 
and continuing for a full day or shift, through three full days. 
The Canadian Department of Labour does not provide a completely 
équivalent categorization but they do provide statistics on work stoppages 
which last for a period of under five days. There are some problems with 
making inferences on the inoidence of wildcat from thèse data. In the 
first place, not ail wildcat strikes are of less than five days' duration. 
Secondly, not ail strikes that are of less than five days' duration are wild-
cat strikes. However, if the assumption is accepted that wildcat strikes are 
characteristically of short duration then we can speak in relative and 
approximate terms of the incidence of wildcats over time. 
Table I brings the appropriate statistics together. This suggests that 
the number of short-term strikes in Canada increased at a moderate rate 
through the years of 1956 to 1964. It also indicates that in the year 
1964-65 there was quite a sharp increase in the number of such strikes, 
followed by a sharp increase again the following year. Although there 
was a sharp increase in 1966, this only constituted a very small increase 
(0.3% ) as a percentage of total strikes in the country. This is merely an 
indication of the fact that there was a sharp increase in strikes of ail kinds 
during that year. The incidence of short-term strikes declined somewhat 
in 1967 and again in 1968 but gathered strength again in 1969. 
2
 A pseudo-wildcat is defined as one which is covertly sponsored or promoted 
by union officers. 
3
 KUHN, J.W., Bargaining in Grievance Seulement, Columbia University Press, 
1961, pp. 53-55. 
608 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 27, NO 4 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF WORK STOPPAGES OF SHORT DURATION, (UNDER 5 DAYS) 1956-1969 
AND NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED 
Strikes & Lockouts Workers Involved 
Year 
Number 
Per Cent 
of Total Number 
Per cent 
of Total 
1956 91 40.0 40,984 46.2 
1957 109 45.4 40,337 47.8 
1958 106 42.9 26,627 24.9 
1959 95 44.8 35,781 36.7 
1960 126 48.6 17,945 37.4 
1961 130 49.0 38.337 40.6 
1962 145 48.8 35,123 48.7 
1963 147 46.5 39,494 47.3 
1964 159 49.7 39,289 41.6 
1965 226 48.6 64,646 38.5 
1966 289 48.9 138,833 34.2 
1967 204 41.0 112,300 45.8 
1968 174 31.6 51,477 23.3 
1969 202 36.2 114,877 38.0 
SOURCE: Queen's Printer, Ottawa. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, for each year 
1956 through 1966 and information supplied by Canada Department of 
Labour for other years. 
An alternative approach to making assessments of the approximate 
incidence of wildcat strikes within a System is to trace the incidence of 
strikes on the basis of the contract status of the parties at the time of 
their origination. If we are prepared to make the assumption that the vast 
majority of wildcat strikes occur during the contract terni, then we hâve 
statistics available for making this kind of estimate. The deficiencies of 
this approach are that not ail wildcat strikes occur during the contract 
period and not ail strikes that do occur during the contract period are 
genuine wildcats. However, this does provide us with another basis for 
making an approximate assessment of relative incidence. 
Table II shows this trend for the Canadian system. Thèse data show 
the incidence increasing sharply from 1964 to 1966, with a very sharp 
increase in 1966, with something of a décline in later years, although it 
should be noted that the duration in man-days was again relatively high 
in 1969. 
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TABLE II 
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN CANADA 1956 - 1969 OCCURRTNG DURING 
THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT 
No. of Workers Duration in 
Year Strikes Involved Man-Days 
1956 81 29,638 110,525 
1957 82 33,508 139,926 
1958 62 20,690 62,170 
1959 55 15,894 37,960 
1960 81 16,045 59,200 
1961 65 15,253 37,850 
1962 72 16,234 58,340 
1963 79 28,427 58,610 
1964 111 18,945 181,760 
1965 132 37,443 121,610 
1966 213 68,721 281,420 
1967 160 95,466 180,930 
1968 124 32,183 102,190 
1969 139 53,726 224,480 
SOURCE: Queen's Printer, Ottawa. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, for each year 
1956 through 1966 and information supplied by Canada Department of 
Labour for other years. 
A much greater degree of accuracy could be obtained by using the 
combined criteria of strikes that were of short duration and occurred 
during the term of the contract but this information is not available. 
From a sociological point of view thèse approaches to the production 
of patterns of incidence, over time, are very unsatisfactory. Since thèse 
estimâtes are related to the total Canadian System, we can only make 
inferences with respect to the total system. That is, we are directed to 
consider variables at the level of the total society such as societal 
économie fluctuations and the like. This, however, might not be the kind 
of variable that is operating. To make meaningful sociological analysis of 
the overall incidence of wildeat strikes we could require to hâve informa-
tion on the relationship of the wildeats to a great many other variables, 
such as: industrial location, régional location, union involved, rates of 
technological innovation in the affected industries, and so on. Since thèse 
are not available, no sociological analysis can be made by operating at 
the level of estimated incidence for the total system. 
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This throws us back to a position where we are required to approach 
the problem on the basis of particular cases. Nevertheless, the data does 
indicate that the incidence of the phenomenon of the short-term strike 
(and, by inferenoe, the wildcat) has been growing in Canada in récent 
years. 
REPORT OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
A récent study by the author was concerned with an investigation of 
the nature of the wildcat strike phenomenon. Concern in the area first 
emerged out of the belief that the incidence of wildcat strikes was increas-
ing. A concern with the growth in incidence directed attention to the 
more fondamental question of cause. A review of the literature clearly 
indicated that the phenomenon had been woefully neglected by socio-
logists. Predictably, economists had decided that wildcat strikes were 
caused by économie factors and industrial relationists had decided that 
they were similar to a whole range of other pressure tactics that workers 
used against management. 
A sociological approach to the problem was clearly called for and, 
in the sociological tradition, an effort had to be made to establish how 
this particular phenomenon was related to others at the more gênerai level. 
This led to récognition of the fact that, in essence, the wildcat strike was 
similar to a range of other phenomena in other sectors of society. Ail of 
thèse had one thing in common : the rejection of institutional channels 
for the solution of collective problems. The concept of the non-institutional 
response was developed as a gênerai concept covering ail situations in 
which groups resorted to non-institutional means to attempt to solve 
their problems. Within this context, the wildcat strike may be regarded 
as non-institutional response in the industrial sector. This presented a 
particularly interesting problem in that in the industrial sector complex 
channels apparently existed for the solution of problems and yet wildcat 
continued to occur. 
It was recognized, from considération of the literature, that a satis-
factory définition of the phenomenon had not yet been generated. 
Certainly, none of the variety of définitions came close to an adéquate 
sociological définition. In pursuit of this task, it became clear that the 
wildcat strike belonged within the collective behavior perspective and, 
therefore, any adéquate définition would hâve to take this into account. 
Following a review of prior attempts, and the spécification of the neces-
sary éléments of an adéquate sociological définition, such a définition, 
incorporating the collective behavior perpective, was generated. 
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The next task that was confronted was the paradoxical one of dis-
tinction and synthesis. This involved considération of a scheme that would 
make meaningful distinctions between différent types of wildcat strikes 
and yet incorporate ail possible types within its rubric. To this end a 
typology was generated. 
After considérable thought, and a measure of prompting, it was 
realized that a wildcat strike always involves an élément of union 
« failure >. This led to an examination of the various functions that a 
union fulfills as a basis for identification of the potential loci of union 
failure which might constitute the prerequisite for the occurrence of a 
wildcat strike. A gênerai discussion, in thèse terms produced a number 
of hypothèses that stand in need of empirical testing. 
Two cases of wildcat strikes were studied in great détail and the 
events described and analyzed in terms of part of Smelser's theory of 
collective behavior. This scheme, modified to make distinctions between 
différent types of structural strain, and combined with the concept of 
primary direction of hostility, proved to be a very useful tool for the 
analysis of the phenomenon. 
The two empirical cases studied proved to be two of the major types 
of wildcats generated in the typological scheme. The Lake Steel wildcat 
wat found to be explicable in terms of the political situation within the 
union.4 Thus, it was an industrial wildcat, against the union, with the 
major sources of strain in the situation located within the union itself. 
The Northern Mining wildcat, on the other hand, was an industrial wild-
cat, against the company, with the major sources of strain located within 
the company.5 
It has to be recognized that the findings of this study were limited 
by a number of circumstances. First, a single union, and a single set of 
national officers, were involved in both wildcats ; second, both wildcats 
occurred at the same temporal point of the contractual relationship ; third, 
both cases involved local unions with unusually large memberships (over 
10,000). Ail of thèse circumstances may be said to limit the degree to 
which the findings may be generalized. The other side of this coin, thought, 
is that the degree of commonality in the circumstances of the two situations 
enhanced the reliability of common findings. While one strike was directed 
against the union and the other against the company, a number of common 
4
 FLOOD, Maxwell, Wildcat Strike in Lake City. Information Canada, 1970. 
5 FLOOD, Maxwell, The Wildcat Strike, op. cit. 
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problems and strains were found existing in thèse loeals. For example, 
both cases showed évidence of serious communication problems between 
the officers and their membership. Both showed an approach to the nego-
tiation process that can only be described as « secret bargaining » that 
gave rise, in both instances, to the génération of ambiguity and rumour 
— two factors closely associated with the susceptibility of persons to 
accept generalized beliefs. Both cases exhibited a virtual breakdown of 
the grievance procédure through the application of unenlightened Com-
pany policies and the failure of the unions, in both cases, to cope with 
this company strategy. And, probably, most important of ail, both unions 
exhibited considérable factionalization. The degree of factionalization 
observed in thèse cases was rather severe and would suggest that very 
large local unions are liable to factionalization and a struggle for power 
that, in some circumstances, will resuit in factions invoking the non- ins-
titutional response. This situation, it would appear, is likely to peak in 
the advent of the contract negotiation process. This, due to the secret 
bargaining strategy that is commonly adopted, is the point of maximum 
ambiguity and provides fertile ground for the organized faction to discrédit 
the incumbent officers by innuendo and other means. There seems to be 
little need for the degree of secrecy that prevails in thèse situations — it 
may be part of the hangover of the early days of the organized. labor 
movement ; one that has outlived its usefulness. 
The study can only be regarded as a faltering step toward under-
standing the phenomenon of the wildcat strike since many empty cells 
remain in the typology. There is also a need for many more case studies 
of ail types that will deal with the many variables that are in opération in 
this kind of situation : size of local, type of industry, temporal status of 
contract, organizational structure, technological status and the like. The 
factors of the intensity and extensity of particular cases is also a matter 
that ought to be given future considération. 
Three empirical questions were posed at the outset as typical of the 
kinds of questions that had to be answered : So far as the two cases 
studied were concerned answers may now be attempted. 
1. Why, despite the availability of elaborate institutional 
mechanismSj do groups of workers produce a non-ins-
titutional response as they attempt to cope with situa-
tions that they define as problems ? 
In the Lake Steel case, the workers were faced with the problem 
that they felt that their officers could not be trusted to maximize the 
contract negotiations on their behalf. This belief was generated and spread 
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by persons who had mterests other than the contract on their minds. The 
union officers failed to convey the status of the negotiations to the 
membership. This led to the growth of ambiguity and strain ; a condition 
that was utilized by the factions. The factions defined the solution as a 
wildcat strike that would indicate to the officers the militancy of the 
membership and encourage them to maximize the negotiation process. 
In the Northern Mining case, the workers were faced with the 
problem that they felt that their officers had no way to cope with the 
company's strategy of stalling the negotiation process until the winter 
months. They felt that the Provincial labor law would permit the company 
to pursue its objective. On the basis of bitter expérience, informai leaders 
and factions spread the belief that the only way to cope with the situation 
was to wildcat as soon as the existing contract ran out. 
2. Why do groups of workers reject the union their legi-
timate spokesman and change agent, as they seek to 
solve problems arising in the employée-management 
relationship ? 
In the Lake Steel case, the workers rejected the union because they were 
convinced that it was under the domination of the national and inter-
national office and, from an earlier expérience, they felt that there was a 
strong possibility that their position would not be maximized at the 
bargaining table. There was also a widespread view that the union had 
a bad record with respect to the grievance procédure where they had 
allowed the company to apply a legalistic approach which stifled the whole 
procédure. 
In the Northern Mining case, the workers dit not reject the union. 
They simply defined the situation as one in which the union was unable 
to act due to the possibility of légal sanctions being applied to them if 
they engaged in an illégal strike. Recognizing this fact, they did not reject 
the union but acted outside of the formai organization in a way that would 
not hâve repercussions for the union or its officers. 
3. Is the non-institutional behavior a response to the 
concrète working environment, the industrial structure, 
the union-organizational structure, or a displaced res-
ponse to factors in the wider social system ? 
In any given case, participants could be found who were responding on 
the basis of any one, or any combination, of ail of the above factors. 
However, to answer this question what should be determined is the pré-
dominant motivational source of the collective action. In the Lake Steel 
case, the motivation of the factions was in terms of the union-organiza-
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tional structure, while that of most of the workers was in terms of the 
concrète working environment and the désire for an improved contract. 
In the Northern Mining case, the motivation was in terms of the 
concrète working environement and the désire for an improved contract. 
This was reinforced by the présence of a strong désire for revenge against 
the company for their behavior in 1958. 
It is ironie to note that the British Government at the présent time 
is attempting to legislate wildcat strikes (unauthorized stoppages) out of 
existence. Perhaps they should examine the fact that, in North America, 
where the wildcat strike is an illégal act, the phenomenon continues to 
assert itself, and with increasing incidence in this présent décade. 
La contestation dans les relations du travail au Canada 
Cet article veut être une tentative d'explication des grèves sauvages dans 
l'industrie manufacturière au Canada. L'auteur assimile ces grèves aux phénomènes 
de plus en plus nombreux qui consistent dans un processus par lequel des personnes, 
encadrées dans une institution qui leur devient de plus en plus insupportable, la 
rejettent et recourent aux moyens du bord pour changer la situation. 
En ce sens, la grève sauvage serait la réaction spontanée et inorganisée des 
travailleurs contre les organisations syndicales institutionnalisées. Depuis que les 
syndicats se sont donné des structures, qu'ils ont mis au point des mécanismes pour 
résoudre les problèmes professionnels, sociaux et économiques des travailleurs, qu'ils 
sont devenus de vastes organisations, est-ce qu'on n'assisterait pas à la croissance 
des grèves sauvages ? Est-ce que, avec le temps, les organisations syndicales n'au-
raient pas perdu le sens des intérêts les plus importants de certains groupes de leurs 
membres, d'où la naissance de conflits résultant d'appréciations diverses des fins 
recherchées : responsabilité et militantisme, buts éloignés et buts immédiats ? Est-ce 
que le syndicalisme ne se serait pas trop bureaucratisé à mesure qu'il croissait ? 
Mais une première question se pose : quelle est l'importance des grèves sau-
vages au Canada ? Il n'y a pas de statistiques sur le nombre des grèves sauvages 
au Canada. Pour essayer de les découvrir, il faut procéder par voie de déduction. 
La première caractéristique d'une grève sauvage, c'est qu'on peut la considérer de 
courte durée. Les grèves de courte durée (cinq jours ou moins) ont subi au Canada 
une courbe ascendante marquée de 1956 à 1966, puis elles ont beaucoup diminué 
par la suite pour faire un nouveau bond en 1969. Mais on ne peut affirmer que 
toutes les grèves de courte durée sont des grèves sauvages. Comme autre caracté-
ristique, on pourrait soumettre que les grèves sauvages se produisent en cours de 
convention. Mais, encore là, il est certain que toutes ces grèves ne sont pas des 
grèves sauvages. 
À défaut de renseignements satisfaisants, force est donc de se rabattre sur une 
analyse sociologique. Sur ce point, l'auteur estime que la grève sauvage ressemble 
à d'autres phénomènes de même nature qui se présentent dans d'autres secteurs de 
la société par le rejet des canaux normaux et institutionnels pour la solution de 
problèmes collectifs. 
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En cherchant à cerner ainsi le concept ou le contenu de la grève sauvage, on 
en arrive vite à la conclusion que l'un de ces éléments est toujours la « faillite » 
du syndicat. Deux cas de grève sauvage ont été étudiés à Lake Steel et à Northern 
Mining. Dans le premier cas, elle était faite nettement contre le syndicat ; dans le 
deuxième cas, elle l'était contre l'entreprise. Dans les deux, on a retrouvé des 
caractéristiques communes. Il s'agissait notamment de deux syndicats groupant 
plus de 10,000 membres ; on s'est rendu compte du manque de communication 
entre les dirigeants et les travailleurs de la base ; on était engagé dans des processus 
de négociations secrètes ; le mécanisme de règlements des réclamations avait failli 
à sa tâche ; les syndicats n'avaient pas pu vaincre la stratégie de l'entreprise et, ce qui 
est encore plus important, dans l'un et l'autre syndicats, il existait des factions qui 
s'opposaient. 
Ceci, évidemment, ne saurait suffire à la compréhension du phénomène et il 
faudrait sans doute faire l'étude de plusieurs autres cas afin de déceler l'ensemble 
des causes qui sont responsables des grèves sauvages et les expliquer valablement. 
Au fond, comme il a été tenté de le faire dans les deux cas précités, ne fau-
drait-il pas chercher réponse aux trois questions suivantes. 
Pourquoi, même si l'on dispose de mécanismes complexes, les groupes de tra-
vailleurs sentent-ils le besoin de réagir spontanément pour faire face à la situation ? 
Pourquoi des groupes de travailleurs rejettent-ils le syndicat, les leaders qu'ils 
se sont donnés, alors qu'ils cherchent à résoudre des problèmes relatifs aux rela-
tions professionnelles ? 
Ne serait-ce pas là une réaction spontanée au milieu ouvrier ambiant, à l'or-
ganisation de l'entreprise, aux structures du syndicalisme ou au système social 
global ? 
Il est amusant de constater que, à l'heure actuelle, le gouvernement britanni-
que tente de légiférer pour mettre un terme aux grèves sauvages, quand, en Amé-
rique du Nord, où la grève sauvage est illégale, le phénomène continue de s'affirmer 
et prend même plus d'ampleur à mesure que le temps avance. 
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